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CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw-EQuAL PnoTECTION-R.AcIAL REsTRICTIVB Cov-

DEED OF CEMETERY LoT AS DEFENSE TO DAMAGE ACTION-Plaintiff
brought a damage action1 against a private cemetery2 for its refusal to permit
the interment of her Indian husband in a burial lot which she had purchased
from the defendant cemetery under a contract restricting burial privileges to
members of the Caucasian race. Held, reliance upon a restrictive covenant
to deny recovery does not constitute state action in violation of the equal
protection clause !)f the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.
Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, (Iowa 1953) 60 N.W. (2d) 110.3
It has long been held that state legislation requiring racial segregation
in the ownership and possession of land is unconstitutional.4 Conversely, a
state itself has been able to make such discrimination illegal by civil rights
statutes.5 But it remained for the landmark Restrictive Covenant Cases 6 to
hold that racial restrictive covenants in a deed of land could not be enforced
by injunction in equity against a purchaser because such enforcement would
constitute state action denying equal protection of the laws in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 However, the language in Shelley v. KraemerS
to the effect that the restrictive covenant itself was not invalid and that no
one's rights under the Constitution were violated by the covenantor's voluntary
adherence thereto left open many questions. One of these was answered in
BNANT IN

1 Plaintiff asked judgment for $20,000 damages as a direct result of the breach of the
contract due to humiliation, ridicule, and mental pain and suffering. In addition, the
plaintiff asked for $40,000 in punitive damages for willful breach of the contract. It is
questionable, if recovery were allowed at all, whether exemplary damages would be assessable.
See McComncK, DAMAGES §81 (1935).
2 The mere exemption of a cemetery from taxation by the state does not fix its character as a quasi-public one. Gaskill v. Forest Home Cemetery Co., 258 ill. 36, 101 N.E.
219 (1913), cert. den. 238 U.S. 606, 35 S.Ct. 602 (1915). Cf. Kerr v. Enoch Pratt
Library, (4th Cir. 1945) 149 F. (2d) 212, cert. den. 326 U.S. 721, 66 S.Ct. 26 (1945).
See also 52 Ml:cH. L. REv. 153 (1953).
3 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case on April 12, 1954.
22 U.S. LAW WEEK 3256.
4Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 38 S.Ct. 16 (1917).
5 State statutes are cited and digested in MANGUM, THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE
NEGRO, c. 3, pp. 26-77 (1940). The Constitution allows the states to refrain from passing
such legislation, however. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 S.Ct. 18 (1883). An Iowa
statute specifically excepts private church and fraternal cemeteries from those cemeteries
which may not deny the privilege of interment solely because of the race or color of the
deceased person. Iowa Acts (1953) c. 84, §§1, 8. Since this statute denies to the directors
of some cemeteries the power to discriminate while allowing others freedom of action, its
constitutionality might be questioned as violating the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
6 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24,
68 S.Ct. 847 (1948).
7 It has been held since an early date that the action of state courts and judicial officers
in their judicial capacities was to be regarded as action of the state within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
8 Note 6 supra.
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the recent case of Barrows v. Jackson. 9 The United States Supreme Court
held that such a restrictive covenant could not be enforced at law by a damage
action against a co-covenantor who allegedly broke the covenant. The Court
reasoned that to allow damages would be just as much a denial of equal
protection to the purchaser as would be specific enforcement of the restrictive
covenant. In the principal case, however, the victim of the discrimination,
rather than the discriminator, brought the damage action for breach of contract. The defendant contended that the racial restrictive covenant in the
contract justified his breach. Is the court's decision upholding the defense
state action in enforcing the restrictive covenant? The Iowa court answered
this question in the negative,10 concluding that only when the state court
takes affirmative action by granting injunctions, specific performance, and
other active aids, is it state action within the Fourteenth Amendment. But
as the Supreme Court in Barrows v. Jackson pointed out, action which indirectly aids discrimination is just as clearly a denial of equal protection as
specific enforcement of a restrictive covenant. In Clifton v. Puente a Texas
court said: ''It is as much an enforcement of the covenant to deny to a
person a legal right to which he would be entitled except for the covenant
as it would be to expressly command by judicial order that the terms of the
covenant be recognized and carried out. No valid distinction can be predicated upon the position of a party . . . as a plaintiff or as a defendant."11
If the Iowa court's refusal to allow damages constitutes state action in upholding the restrictive covenant, then in light of the Supreme Court cases12
dealing with a state's denial of equal rights based upon an individual's race
or color, the conclusion is inescapable that such action is a violation of the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment In the principal case,
the only basis18 for the court's denying the plaintiff recovery for breach of
L. REv. 293 (1953).
supra.
Plaintiff, in possession of
land, brought an action in trespass to try title to the realty. Defendant, a purchaser seeking
to enter the land, :filed a cross-action. In the cross-action the plaintiff's defense was based
on the fact that in the defendant's chain of title was a deed containing a restrictive covenant
and forfeiture provision, and since the defendant was a member of the restricted class, his
action could not prevail. It was held that to allow such a defense would constitute state
action violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf. Claremont
Improvement Club v. Buckingham, 89 Cal. App. (2d) 32, 200 P. (2d) 47 (1948), where
the court refused to issue a declaratory judgment to the effect that a restrictive covenant
to forfeit the sale of land, standing alone, was valid since this would be using a state agency
to enforce a restrictive covenant.
12 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); Buchanan v. Warley, note 4
supra; Shelley v. Kraemer, note 6 supra; Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 70 S.Ct. 848
(1950); Barrows v. Jackson, note 9 supra.
13 If the clause was held to be unconstitutional, estoppel could not be invoked since that
doctrine cannot aid a contract which is prohibited by a constitutional provision. American
Nat. Bank v. Sommerville, 191 Cal. 364, 216 P. 376 (1923); Deer Creek Highway Dist.
v. Doumecq Highway Dist., 37 Idaho 601, 218 P. 371 (1923); Awotin v. Atlas Exchange
Nat. Bank, 295 U.S. 209, 55 S.Ct. 674 (1935); United States v. Golden, (10th Cir. 1929)
34 F. (2d) 367.
9

346 U.S. 249, 73 S.Ct. 1031 (1953), noted 52

M:rCH.

10 Accord, Gaskill v. Forest Home Cemetery Co., note 2
11 Tex. Civ. App. 1949) 218 S.W. (2d) 272 at 274.
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the contract was that there was no breach since under the contract's terms
no non-Caucasian could be buried in the cemetery. The opinions in Shelley
11. Kraemer and Barrows 11. Jackson call for a decision that the Iowa court's
ruling constitutes state enforcement of a restrictive covenant.14 To hold
otherwise would be to sanction discriminatory state action.

Lawrence N. Rcwick

14 "The difference between judicial enforcement and non-enforcement of the restrictive
covenants is the difference to petitioners between being denied rights of property available
to other members of the community and being accorded full enjoyment of those rights on
an equal footing." Shelley v. Kraemer, note 6 supra, at 19. See also language in Ming,
''Racial Restrictions and the Fourteenth Amendment," 16 Umv. Cm. L. R:Ev. 203 at 234235 (1949).

